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Brå is an authority that works to reduce crime and increase safety in society. We do this by gathering facts and disseminating knowledge about crime, crime fighting and crime prevention work, primarily to the government and authorities within the justice system.
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Attempts to influence elected officials and municipal administrations. English summary of Brå report 2025:4
This is a study of undue influence exerted by actors and groups constituting a systemic threat in Sweden. The study includes mapping undue influence against elected officials, political parties and decision-making bodies, as well as shedding light on what forms undue influence can take against municipalities.
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The original report (in Swedish)
Undue influence is an umbrella term for situations where an outsider, in a way that is illegal or perceived as unpleasant or inappropriate, tries to influence the professional behaviour of someone – here, an elected official or a municipal employee. The influencer must have an intention to influence and pursues this intention through, for example, harassment, threats, violence, vandalism or improper offers or relationships (such as bribery or cronyism). In certain contexts, undue influence can also be pursued through more indirect approaches that are not necessarily criminal, such as unpleasant indirect threats or inappropriate comments. If the attempt to influence succeeds, it can lead to actual influence.
In this study, actors posing a systemic threat are interpreted as actors within organised crime and violent extremism. These are actors who have antagonistic motives or otherwise challenge the public good and who possess a so-called collective intimidation capital. The undue influence of these actors typically means that their collective intimidation capital is enough to grant subtle threats and innuendos an intimidating effect, achieving an outcome similar to that which would otherwise require actual threats or acts of violence.
The attempts of criminal groups to influence elected officials and municipalities have been widely publicised in recent years. In this study, we can confirm that attempts to influence are made by actors posing a systemic threat, but find it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions regarding their prevalence or growth. As reported in the interim report, victimisation among elected officials has neither increased nor decreased over the past decade. However, the rate of victimisation is higher during election years, and victimisation on social media has increased. Over the entire period studied, at least one in ten elected officials was subjected to threats, violence or vandalism by actors posing a systemic threat on an annual basis. Right- and left-wing extremists are behind most of these incidents. Members of the Riksdag have the highest level of victimisation, but municipal politicians are more often subject to influence attempts by people with links to organised crime. Furthermore, the interim report shows that the consequences can be more severe at the local level as threats are more often communicated verbally, the risk of encountering the influencer in the local community is greater, and elected officials feel more isolated when they are affected.
Regarding attempts to influence municipal employees, our general understanding is that such influence attempts are mainly made by criminal groups or people linked to such groups, and to a lesser extent by people linked to violent extremism. Overall, the number of incidents is likely to be relatively small, but in certain locations and for certain organisations the problem is significant. In addition, interviewees state that one-off influence attempts by actors posing a systemic threat can have long-lasting consequences, both for the individual victim and the organisation as a whole.
Individuals and actors involved in organised crime and violent extremism have different motives for their attempts to influence, which is reflected in their choice of targets and methods. We have identified four broad categories of attempts to influence elected officials and municipal employees.
Actors posing a systemic threat are more strategic than others who seek to influence, and they exploit the individual vulnerabilities of a person as well as the office they hold in their attempts to influence. This increases the risk that attempts to influence will succeed, as well. Working alone and lacking experience are examples of vulnerabilities that are exploited. It is perceived as particularly intimidating when influence attempts allude to the private
sphere of the victimised person, while at the same time referring to the group's collective intimidation capital. The availability of personal data is therefore described as a particular challenge.
Municipal employees and politicians also have particular vulnerabilities that increase the risk of both victimisation and successful influence – especially in cases where the behaviour being sought is inaction. First and foremost, this is because influencers can more easily get physically close and create discomfort with their influence attempts in municipalities, where victims are more likely to meet the influencers in the local community. At the same time, the protection of employees and elected officials at the local level is perceived as weaker, compared to the protection of members of the Riksdag and employees of government agencies.
Some municipal employees also have roles with a strong emphasis on relationship building, often leaving room for subjective judgements, which can create ambiguity for themselves as well as for potential influencers. This also increases the risk that influencers will exploit the personal ties created between them and municipal employees to instil empathy, insecurity and fear in employees. These vulnerabilities can be particularly acute in small municipalities, where personal ties are harder to avoid and the scope for anonymity and risk-sharing may be more limited. The risk that personal ties to elected officials will be exploited also increases as the distance between the elected officials and potential influencers shrinks.
Exposure to undue influence from actors posing a systemic threat often leads to anxiety in a person’s everyday life and may result in the victim changing tasks at work, resigning or changing jobs. This anxiety can also spread to colleagues, peers, the organisation and relatives, and contribute to a deteriorating working environment and high staff turnover, which can also make the organisation more vulnerable.
In cases where influence attempts lead to elected officials or municipal employees changing decisions or positions or departing from routines and working methods, the actors posing a systemic threat gain influence in decision-making processes, municipal operations and political issues. For fear of exposure, municipal employees and elected officials sometimes anticipate influence attempts by exercising self-censorship, which can lead to the same serious consequences. In the long term and at the societal level,
undue influence can also mean that controversial issues and activities are curbed or silenced, and that it becomes more difficult to recruit for vulnerable positions and encourage citizen engagement in politics. Ultimately, undue influence risks damaging trust in the rule of law and democracy.
Municipalities, political parties and other stakeholders take measures to prevent and address undue influence. These efforts have come the furthest in the case of Riksdag members. There is a robust organisation, with the political parties, the Riksdag’s security department and the Swedish Security Service taking jointly responsibility for countering undue influence. For elected officials at other levels and municipal employees, efforts are more varied. However, at all levels these efforts commonly fail to detect methods typical of actors posing a systemic threat, i.e., subtle methods of influence and corruption attempts. Among other things, this contributes to under-reporting, a failure to discuss and notice influence attempts, an incomplete picture of the problem for party and municipal leadership, and the failure to always implement measures to prevent and address undue influence.
Preventive measures at the operational level in municipalities are usually centred on avoiding working alone and inappropriate fixation on specific employees in risk situations. However, such measures may be difficult or inappropriate for some offices and employees. At the strategic level, security-aware municipalities often fail to include managers at the operational level, who are often left alone in seeking to prevent and address undue influence. Combined with a low level of knowledge and lack of security awareness, this means that risks are not always recognised and the problem is not made visible. Conflicting signals within the municipality, and shortcomings in communication between the municipality and the police, complicate the process of reporting a crime to the police, and mean that the victim often feels that his or her exposure to attempts to influence is not taken seriously.
When it comes to elected officials, parties at the national level are often relatively unaware of the problems at regional and municipal level, while municipalities take varying degrees of responsibility. As a result, elected officials at these levels are sometimes unaware of risks and often feel isolated in dealing with exposure to attempts to influence. The proposed
legislation to strengthen the protection of certain elected officials (Govt. bill 2024/25:80) partially clarifies the division of responsibilities, but only applies to leading councillors and certain executive members, meaning that the lack of clarity remains for other elected officials, such as chairs and members of social welfare committees, who are also subjected to attempts to influence them.
The criminal justice system has made greater progress in addressing undue influence against elected officials, and efforts have also intensified as sentences for offences against elected officials have been increased. The proposed legislation to strengthen the protection of public servants (Govt. bill 2024/25:141) can contribute to reducing disparities. The Swedish Police Authority has also developed its investigative work in relation to offences against elected officials and has carried out initiatives to increase the propensity to report offences. However, there are significant regional differences in police work.
Actors posing a systemic threat often use methods that are not explicitly illegal, making it difficult to address some influence attempts through the legal system. It is therefore necessary for municipalities, parties and other actors to make preventative efforts in their own organisations. This involves reducing the opportunities for influence attempts while also strengthening the resilience of individuals and organisations. This can reduce exposure to crime and anxiety, while preventing influence attempts from succeeding.
It involves creating a safe working environment and providing employees and elected officials with the knowledge, tools and procedures to avoid, rebuff and address influence attempts. Awareness of vulnerabilities and other circumstances that can be exploited by potential influencers also needs to be raised. Municipalities must also strengthen their administrative culture and clarify the role of public authorities. Stricter controls, clear decision-making processes and consistent exercise of official authority can act as a deterrent and reduce the ability of actors posing a systemic threat to exert undue influence.
The police can also contribute to prevention, including by conducting and disseminating threat and risk assessments. However, in order for these assessments to be based on the true nature of the problem, the Swedish Police Authority must improve its ability to identify more subtle influence
attempts by actors posing a systemic threat and the motives for influence in reports they receive, as well as coordinating existing work within the Authority. They must also improve their information and feedback to victims as well as organisations.
While much undue influence is preventable, we also see a conflict of interest between the legislation and the Swedish governance model on the one hand, and the need for measures to reduce the risk of undue influence on the other. For example, the governance model’s openness poses difficulties in the protection of the individual, and in other areas the need for operational safeguards may need to trump privacy.
Undue influence against elected officials and municipal employees can have far-reaching consequences, especially when those making such attempts are linked to criminal or extremist groups. Such actors are often strategic in their attempts to influence and exploit the vulnerabilities that exist. There is therefore a greater risk that influence attempts will successfully influence professional practice or elected office. Sometimes, the fear of being victimised suffices to make elected officials or municipal employees adapt their professional behaviour. Brå therefore deems that this is a problem that must be taken seriously. Given the difficulties in tackling undue influence through the legal system, Brå finds that it is primarily crime-prevention efforts which must be strengthened.
The concept of undue influence has been used in an increasing number of contexts. This can lead to confusion regarding what the term means and how to tackle the problem. Thought must be given to the meaning of the terms that are used, and their meaning must be explained by Brå and other social actors engaged in producing or disseminating knowledge in this area.
Municipalities are at the focal point of Swedish public administration and have a broad mandate. This means that influence attempts can also take various forms. The problem of undue influence is therefore particularly complex for municipalities, yet remains relatively unexplored. This study has provided examples of what undue influence can look like in the municipalities, but Brå deems that studies of the phenomenon in greater detail are still needed. For example, future studies could include further analyses of the extent of attempted and successful influence, and its impact on society. Undue influence against private providers of public services, such as HVB homes, or organisations of strategic importance, such as ports, are other areas that would be relevant to highlight. In addition, studies from the perspective of the perpetrators could provide more information regarding the role that undue influence plays in the activities of criminal and extremist groups.
The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) has been commissioned by the Government to study undue influence exerted by actors and groups constituting a systemic threat in Sweden. The commission includes mapping undue influence against elected officials, political parties and decision-making bodies, as well as shedding light on what forms undue influence can take against municipalities. Particular focus is on actors and groups connected to organised crime (Ju2023/00880). The overall aim of the project is to contribute to efforts to prevent organised crime and other actors posing a systemic threat in Sweden from exerting influence over some of the most fundamental institutions and actors of the democratic system. An interim report for the project was published in December 2023, with the memorandum Utsatthet bland förtroendevalda (Brå 2023). This study is the final report in the project. As part of its commission, Brå has also produced a separate handbook aimed primarily at municipal administrations (Brå 2025).
The data for the interim report consisted primarily of responses to The Politician’s Safety Survey (PTU), which has been conducted on six occasions since 2012, supplemented by interviews with victimised elected officials, specialists and experts in the field. In addition, this final report is based on interviews with municipal employees in a number of selected municipalities, as well as with the security officers and other representatives of political parties. In total, nearly 200 people were interviewed. The interviews in the municipalities were complemented by a survey of municipal security managers.
Published:
Undue influence by criminal and extremist groups – Brottsförebyggande rådet (Brå)
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